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North Carolina Community Banks: Survival Strategies
for Turbulent Times
I. INTRODUCTION

Community banks in North Carolina are facing new challenges

in an already uncertain market. Although the melodies of the string
quartet playing "Song d' Automne" can still be heard, it is impossible

not to notice that the ship is sinking.' After struggling to comply with
regulations imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), 2 community

banks are now facing significant new regulations and risk-based capital
requirements imposed by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) 3 and Basel 111.4 The increased
cost of compliance and higher capital requirements are placing great

strains on community banks, and many 6must either find a buyer to
infuse new capital5 or be subject to failure.
1. The band aboard the Titanic was playing "Song d' Automne" (Song of Autumn)
while the Titanic sank, according to an interview given to The New York Times by the
Titanic's junior wireless operator, Harold Bride, upon his arrival to New York via the rescue
ship Carpathia. Harold Bride, Thrilling Tale by Titanic's Surviving Wireless Man, N. Y.
1912),
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive(Apr.
28,
TIMES
free/pdf?_r=l &res=9C02E3DD 103AE633A2575BC2A9629C946396D6CF.
2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266).
3. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
4. Press Release, Bank of Int'l Settlements, Basel Ill: A Global Regulatory
Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Sys. (Dec. 2010) [hereinafter Basel III],
availableat http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189 dec20 10.htm.
5. See Press Release, N. C. Office of the Comm'r of Banks, First Bank in Troy, NC,
Acquires Deposits of the Bank of Asheville (Jan. 21, 2011), available at
http://www.nccob.gov/public/docs/News/Press%20Releases/thebankofashevillepressrelease.
pdf (expressing displeasure at the closure of another state bank, but highlighting that it was
acquired by a North Carolina bank); see also Barbara A. Rehm, Community Bankers Face a
(June 2,
2012),
Choice: Sell Out, Fold or Change, AM. BANKER
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/operating-revenue-community-banks- 10383651.html?CMP=OTC-RSS.
6. See Dave Clarke, FDIC Expects 50 to 60 US. Bank Failures This Year, REUTERS,
Apr. 17, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/17/financial-regualtionfdic-idUSL2E8FHFSY20120417 (stating that "[c]ommunity banks, many of which have
less than $1 billion in assets, have had the most trouble keeping their doors open..."); see
also Rehm, supra note 5.
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In 1994, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act (Riegle-Neal) 7 repealed the restrictions on interstate
9
8
branching and interstate banking set forth by the Douglas Amendment
of the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA).' ° Riegle-Neal allowed
large banks to open new branches and acquire existing banks in states
where they were not domiciled." By repealing portions of the GlassSteagall Act (Glass-Steagall) 12 in 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(GLBA) 13 lifted prohibitions on common ownership of investment
banks and commercial banks by bank holding companies and promoted
consolidation in the financial industry. Unfortunately, even in an
increasingly consolidated market, 14 many community banks have no
potential acquirers.' 5 The recent success of community bank mergers
seems to suggest that the best hope for community banks in North
Carolina may be to band together.
This Note will focus on the various options available to North
Carolina community banks in need of additional capital or struggling
7. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
8. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL
SERVICE ACTIVITIES 659 (4th ed. 2010).

9. The Douglas Amendment limited a bank holding company to acquiring no more
than 5% of voting stock in any out-of-state bank. Charles Morris, The Competitive Effects of
Interstate Banking, 69 FED. RES. BANK OF KAN. CITY ECON. REV., Nov. 1984, at 3, 4,

available
at
http://www.kc.frb.org/PUBLICAT/EconRev/EconRevArchive/1 984/4q84morr.pdf.
10. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1956). The BHCA amended the McFadden Act of 1927, which
allowed banks to branch in any state but were restricted by the laws of that state. Morris,
supra note 9.
11. BROOME, supra note 8, at 659.
12. The Glass-Steagel Act is part of the Banking Act of 1933 (establishing, amongst
other things, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)). Pub.L. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162
(1933).

13. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
14. Brought about in part by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub.L. 106-102, 113 Stat.
1338 (1999), that effectively repealed Glass-Steagall, part of the Banking Act of 1933, 48
Stat. 162 (1933). Gramm-Leach-Bliley allowed the merging of commercial banks and
investment banks, which, in addition to promoting consolidation in the market, arguably
helped cause the financial crisis. Compare James Rickards, Repeal of Glass-Steagall
Caused

the

Financial

Crisis,

ECON.

INTELLIGENCE

(Aug.

27,

2012),

http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/20 12/08/27/repeal-of-glasssteagall-caused-the-financial-crisis, with Barry Ritholtz, Repeal of Glass-Steagall: Not a
cause, but a multiplier, THE BIG PICTURE (Aug. 11, 2012, 9:00 AM),
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2012/08/repeal-of-glass-steagall-not-a-cause-but-a-multiplier/.
15. Interview with Anthony Gaeta, Adjunct Professor of Law, UNC School of Law, in
Chapel Hill, N.C. (Sept. 6, 2012) (notes on file with the North Carolina Banking Institute
Journal).
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from the increased costs of regulatory compliance. It will argue that
without potential purchasers, community banks may need to band
together through mergers to obtain the critical size needed to absorb
6
new compliance costs and to attract private equity capital.'
Part II will provide the background of the legislative events
leading up to the current community banking crisis and the effects of
the legislation. 17 Next, Part III will explore the options available to
North Carolina community banks in order to raise capital and
successfully comply with new and existing regulations.' 8 The potential
benefits and problems with each of these strategies will be explored in
this section, as well as the potential problems that may arise if any of
these strategies are employed.' 9 Additionally, Part III will consider how
the Federal Reserve's Final Policy Statement on Qualifications for
Failed Bank Acquisitions in 2009 (Final Policy Statement) 20 affects
M&A activity among community banks. Finally, Part IV will discuss
the adverse effects that the shrinking number of community banks may
have on communities, and whether there are entities, such as larger
interstate banks or credit unions, that can fill the void left by community
banks. 21 The question remains, will the disappearance of community
banks devastate North Carolina communities by decreasing the
availability of mortgage and small business loans, or is the inevitable
disappearance of community banks simply a natural and welcomed
22
stage in the evolution of the banking industry?

16.

Id.

17.
18.

See infra Part 11.
See infra Part Ill.

19. See infra Part Il.
20. Final Statement of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions, 74 Fed.
Reg.
45,440
(FDIC
Sept.
2,
2009),
available
at
www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2009/09FinalSOP92.pdf [hereinafter Final Policy
Statement]. See also Statement of Policy on Qualificationsfor Failed Bank Acquisitions
Q&As, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/faqfbqual.html (last updated Apr. 23,
2010) [hereinafter Final Policy Statement Q&A].
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See Steve Cocheo, The Community Bank of the Future: What s It Going to Look
Like?,

AM.

BANKERS

ASS'N

BANKING

J.,

May

2010,

available

http://www.ababj.com/briefing/the-community-bank-of-the-future-what-s-it-going-to-looklike.html (discussing the future relevance of community banks).

at

336

II.
A.
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THE EFFECTS OF INCREASED REGULATIONS ON COMMUNITY BANKS

Acts and Regulations
1. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act

In 1994, Riegle-Neal amended the BHCA, and opened the door
to interstate bank branching. z3 Interstate branching allowed large outof-state banks to establish branches in other states, often by acquisition
of a community bank in that state. 24 Out-of-state banks were also then
able to establish de novo branches in the new state.2 5 The number of
potential competitors for local community banks significantly increased
as a result of interstate branching. 26 Certain provisions of Riegle-Neal
allowed bank holding companies to acquire banks in other states even if
the acquisition conflicted with state laws.2 7
One provision of Riegle-Neal was specifically designed to
protect community banks by prompting federal review of any branch
that has less than one-half the state's average ratio of in-state loans to
in-state deposits. 2 8 This protected communities by ensuring that out-ofstate banks would not simply take deposits from one state and use them
to make loans in another state, but would instead use the deposits to
"meet the needs of that community." 29 That restriction may have
prevented large banks from siphoning money out of one state and into
another, but community banks suffered as a result of the competition
brought about by interstate branching. 30 Moreover, because banks were
able to create de novo branches, competition increased 31 and acquisition

23. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-448, at 19 (1994), reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2039,
2042 (stating that "geographic restraints on banking have been in place for more than half a
century.").
24. BROOME, supra note 8, at 660.
25. Id. at 659.
26. See Morris, supra note 9, at 7-8.
27. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842(d)(1)(A) (effective July 21, 2011).
28. 12 C.F.R. § 25.41 (2013).
29. FDIC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, SECTION X-4.1, PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF
INTERSTATE BRANCHES PRIMARILY FOR DEPOSIT PRODUCTION (2006), available at

http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/pdf/X-4.1.pdf.
30. See Charles Morris, supra note 10, at 7-8.
31. See Elliott Davis, LLC, Community Banking Advisor, Bank Reform - The Good,
the Bad, and the Assorted (Fall 2010), http://www.elliottdavis.com/assets/CommunityBanking-Advisor-Fall-20 10.pdf.
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became less of an option for struggling community banks.3 2
2. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
The GLBA was designed to protect consumers' personal and
financial information.33 However, the GLBA is perhaps best known as
the repeal of Glass-Steagall. By repealing Glass-Steagall, the GLBA
eliminated substantial regulation and allowed bank holding companies
to innovate, merge, and grow into large, complex, and highly leveraged
entities. 34 A bank holding company that met minimal qualifications
under the GLBA could be designated a financial holding company,
allowing it to acquire companies that were engaged in "financial-innature" activities, including investment banks and insurance
companies. 35 The expansion of financial holding companies into a
broader array of financial activities helped to foster the mortgagebacked securities market that contributed to the financial crisis of
37
2008,36 which led to the seven hundred billion dollar federal bailout
and the enactment of Dodd-Frank.3 8
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act
SOX was adopted in the wake of the failure of Enron and was
intended to improve the reliability of disclosures by public companies,
Improving the reliability of
including financial institutions.3 9
disclosures is a reasonable goal, but SOX had some negative effects on
32. See Gary Whalen, The Impact of the Growth of Large, Multistate Banking
Organizations on Community Bank Profitability 9 (OCC, Working Paper No. 2001-5,
2001), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/economicsworking-papers/2008-2000/wp2001-5.pdf.
33. Privacy
Act
Issues
Under
Gramm-Leach-Bliley,
FDIC,
http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/alerts/glba.html (last updated Jan. 29, 2009).
34. Ritholtz, supra note 14.
35. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 103, 113 Stat. 1338, 1342
(1999).
36. See Rickards, supra note 14.
37. The Emergency Economic Stability Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3765.
38. See Bernard Shull, Too Big to Fail: Motives, Countermeasures, and the DoddFrank Response 3 (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard C., Working Paper No.709, 2012), availableat
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_709.pdf.
39. Sarbanes-Oxley Essential Information, SOX-ONLINE,
http://www.soxonline.com/basics.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
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community banks, notably the cost of compliance and the increased cost
of records management. 40 A main concern of community banks is
section 404 of the Act, 4 1 which states, "Issuers are required to publish
information in their annual reports concerning the scope and adequacy
of the internal control structure and procedures for financial
reporting. 4 2 Section 404 placed a tremendous and disproportionate
burden on publicly held community banks, which directly led to a
decrease in profitability and competitiveness. 43 In the three years
following SOX, over seventy-five community banks filed to go private
to avoid SEC regulation.44 The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of
2012 (JOBS Act) 45 allowed small public banks to raise capital without
spending hundreds of thousands of dollars on SEC registration and
compliance by raising the number of shareholders a bank may have
before being required to register with the SEC from 500 to 2,000.46
Additionally, if a bank is registered but meets certain standards, it may
deregister. 47 However, there is a downside to deregistration. If a bank
chooses to deregister, its stock will no longer be publicly traded, making
its stock less liquid and less appealing to potential buyers. 48 In a stockfor-stock acquisition, a seller will want the acquirer's stock to be readily
sellable in a liquid market. 49 In short, deregistering seriously limits any
bank's ability to merge, acquire, or be acquired. Even after the JOBS

40. See Jo Lynne Koehn & Stephen C. Del Vecchio, The Ripple Effect of the SarbanesOxley
Act,
THE
CPA
J.,
2004,
available
at
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/204/essentials/p36.htm.
41. See Letter from Christopher Cole, Regulatory Counsel, Independent Community

Bankers of America, to Nancy M. Morris, Fed. Advisory Comm. Mgmt. Officer, SEC, and
Off.
of
the
Sec'y,
PCAOB
(May
8,
2006),
available
at
http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/cl050806a.pdf.
42. A
Guide
To
Sarbanes-Oxley
Section
404,
SOXLAW
(2004),
http://www.soxlaw.com/s404.htm (last visited October 19, 2012).
43. See Cole, supra note 41.
44. Id.
45. Jumpstart our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 306
(2012).
46. id., at 326; see also Danielle Douglas, JOBS Act Could Give Some Banks a Boost,
CAP. Bus. (April 8, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/jobs-

act-could-give-some-banks-a-boost/2012/04/06/gIQAP2ud4Sstory.html.
47. Jumpstart our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 306,
326 (2012).

48. Gaeta Interview, supra note 15 (stating that because a publicly traded company's
stock is much more ambulatory than a private company, it is preferable to investors and
purchasers).
49.

Id.
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Act, the effects of SOX, although weakened, are still broadly and
50
substantially felt.
4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
Dodd-Frank is the most significant banking legislation since the
Great Depression,"' and many community banks feel that they received
the short end of the stick.52 Specifically, community bankers assert that
(1) it was the large investment banks that caused the financial crisis of
2008 and it is unfair to impose new regulations on small community
banks as a response to something that they had no hand in creating; and
(2) the heavy regulatory burden imposed by Dodd-Frank is
disproportionately damaging to smaller banks.53
Many aspects of Dodd-Frank have caused concern among
community bankers. For example, Dodd-Frank gives the Federal
Reserve (Fed) the authority to examine subsidiaries of bank holding
54
companies (BHCs) and savings and loan holding companies (SLHCs).
Additionally, BHCs must meet increased capital requirements in order
to conduct interstate mergers. 55 Under Dodd-Frank, the Fed will make
capital regulations countercyclical, meaning that capital requirements
will fluctuate based on economic expansion and contraction. 56 Simply
50. See James K. Gentry, Sarbanes-Oxley Impact Extends Far Beyond Public
Companies,
BUISNESSJOURNALISM.ORG
(Dec.
11,
2011),
http://businessjoumalism.org/pages/biz/2006/06/sarbanesoxleyimpact extends fi.
51. Client Alert, Morrison & Foerster LLP, The Dodd-Frank Act: A Cheat Sheet
(2010),
available
at
http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/lmages/SummaryDoddFrankAct.pdf
[hereinafter
Dodd-Frank Cheat Sheet].
52. See Rising Regulatory Compliance Costs and Their Impact on the Health of Small
FinancialInstitutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of
the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
112th Cong.
49
(2012), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ 112-122.pdf (prepared statement of William
Grant on behalf of the American Bankers Association) [hereinafter Grant].
53. See Victoria McGrane, Small Banks Are Blunt in Dislike of New Rules, WALL ST.
J.,
Aug.
7,
2012,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10000872396390443545504577563352622533704.html;
see also id.
54. 12 U.S.C. § 5361(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 2010); see also Press Release, Indep. Cmty.
Bankers Ass'n, ICBA Releases Community Bank Reference Guide to Dodd-Frank (Jan. 25,
2012), available at http://www.icba.org/news/newsreleasedetail.efm?ItemNumber=99100.
55. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 2010); see also Press Release, Indep. Cmty.
Bankers Ass'n, ICBA Releases Community Bank Reference Guide to Dodd-Frank (Jan. 25,
2012), available at http://www.icba.org/news/newsreleasedetail.cfm?ItemNumber=99100.
56. Press Release, Indep. Cmty. Bankers Ass'n, ICBA Releases Community Bank
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put, in good economic times, banks will be required to build a capital
buffer to be drawn from in bad economic times. It follows that more
complex requirements will trigger an increase in the compliance costs.
There will be new small business loan data collection requirements as
well, 57 in addition to the SOX reporting requirements that, again, will
create more administrative and compliance costs.
With Dodd-Frank came the creation of a new regulative agency,
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which, while only
having enforcement authority over banks with $10 billion or more in

assets,58 will have the ability to create rules to prevent "unfair,
deceptive, or abusive practices ' 59 that will be universally applied to
banks of any size. 6' A community bank's current regulator will enforce
62

CFPB rules, 6 ' but it is yet to be seen how extensive those rules will be.
Many rules have been finalized and will become effective in 2013, and
more are likely to be adopted.63

The CFPB does have the ability to
exempt any class of providers, products, or services from a rule, 64 but it
is not often that a government agency uses its power to exempt anyone

from its rules.6 5 Further, it is unclear how much affect, if any, the
Volcker Rule 66 will have on community banks. However, if it is
implemented, it could restrict banking entities from investing in hedge
67
funds or private equity funds.
Despite the potential negative effects of Dodd-Frank on
at
available
2012),
25,
(Jan.
Dodd-Frank
to
Guide
Reference
http://www.icba.org/news/newsreleasedetail.cfm?ItemNumber=99 100.
57. Id.
58. 12 U.S.C. § 5516(a) (Supp. IV 2010).
59. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(b) (Supp. IV 2010).
60. 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (Supp. IV 2010).
61. 12 U.S.C. § 5516 (Supp. IV2010).
62. See Kelsey Weaver, Debate: How Will the CFPB Impact Banks?,
BANKDIRECTOR.COM

(June

20,

2012),

http://www.bankdirector.com/board-

issues/legal/debate-how-will-the-cf-pb-impact-banks/.
63. CFPB Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. § 1005 (2012).
64. 12 U.S.C. § 5512 (Supp. IV 2010).
65. Telephone Interview with Mike Patterson, CEO, CapStone Bank (Sept. 13, 2012)
(notes on file with the North Carolina Banking Institute Journal) (stating that the
government imposes regulations, but rarely removes them).
66. The Volker rule "prohibits banks from engaging in short-term trading of any
security, derivatives and certain other financial instruments from a bank's own funds. And
it prohibits owning, sponsoring, or having certain relationships with a hedge fund or private
Volker Rule: CNBC Explains, CNBC (Apr. 19, 2012),
equity fund."
http://www.cnbc.com/id/44891917/VolckerRuleCNBCExplains.
67. Dodd-Frank Cheat Sheet, supra note 51.
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community banks, there are some provisions that may be beneficial.
For example, coverage under the deposit insurance reform that now
assesses insurance costs based on assets less tangible capital will
permanently raise deposit insurance limits to $250,000,68 which will
reward smaller and conservatively capitalized banks. Additionally,
interest-bearing transaction accounts, such as business checking
accounts, are now authorized,6 9 which may increase deposit capital.
Moreover, Dodd-Frank required that a study be conducted by the SEC
on the burden that SOX 404(b) places on businesses with a market
capitalization of between $75 million and $250 million, as well as a
second study to be conducted by the GAO 70 to compare the capital costs
of exempt and non-exempt companies.71 Community banks with less
than $75 million are currently exempted from the attestation
However, although the SEC has
requirement of SOX 404(b).
recommended keeping SOX 404(b) compliance requirements for
businesses with more than $75 million,7 2 the GAO study, which is due
in July 2013, could cause an increase in the threshold for exemption to
as high as $1 billion.73 Increasing the threshold could lower compliance
costs for many community banks, however slight.
It is difficult to precisely identify the possible implications of
the 848 pages of legislation, 3,894 pages of proposed regulations,74 and
the 400 plus rules 75 that make up Dodd-Frank, but one thing seems
certain: the cost of compliance that North Carolina banks are facing is

68.
69.

Id.
Id.

70.

U.S. Government Accountability Office.

71. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 989G(b), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1948 (2010).
72. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT OF THE SEC, STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ON SECTION 404(B) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 FOR ISSUERS WITH A PUBLIC

FLOAT

BETWEEN

$75

AND

$250

MILLION

49

(2011),

available

at

http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/404bfloat-study.pdf.
73. According to the American Institute of CPAs, various bills have been introduced in
Congress that would expand the Dodd-Frank exemption, including an amendment to the
JOBS Act proposed by congressman Ed Royce of California that would have exempted all
public companies with a public float of less than $1 billion from the 404(b) requirements
(which he later withdrew). Section 404(b) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, AM. INST. OF
CPAS, http://www.aicpa.org/Advocacy/Issues/Pages/Section404bofSOX.aspx (last visited
January 17, 2013).
74.
75.

Grant, supra note 52.

Id.

342
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substantial and potentially devastating.7 6 For example, First United
Bank and Trust, a Maryland bank with assets of $1.38 billion,
conservatively estimates $2.5 million in compliance costs per year.77
Additionally, it estimates that 64% of its approximately 400 employees
will have compliance obligations to fulfill. 78 Larger banking entities
may have a compliance department or in-house counsel in addition to at
least one law firm on retainer, but community banks usually lack such
resources. 79 William B. Grant of the American Bankers Association
(ABA) believes that in addition to the cost of compliance, some rules
themselves, such as mortgage lending rules and municipal advisor
80
registration, will ultimately drive community banks out of business.
Many believe that Dodd-Frank was in essence a trade-off:
regulatory imposition on "Too Big To Fail" (TBTF) banks in return for
a $700 billion TARP8 1 bailout. 82 This has projected the perception that
larger banks will receive government backing in times of crisis, which
has hurt smaller community banks and has made it harder for them to
raise deposit capital.8 3 Indeed, some community bank board members
do not bank with the institution that they represent because they want
84
the security of banking at a TBTF institution.

76.

See generally id.

77. Id.

78. Id.
79. Gaeta Interview, supra note 15.
80. Grant, supra note 52.
81. The Troubled Asset Relief Program was authorized to purchase and guarantee
troubled assets from any financial institution by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
of 2008 (EESA), which was passed to "promote the stability and liquidity of the financial
system."

What is TARP and Why Did We Need It?, U.S. DEP'T. OF THE TREASURY,

http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/about/Pages/What-Is-Tarp.aspx

(last

visited Jan. 17, 2013).
82. See Has Dodd-FrankEnded Too Big to Fail?:HearingBefore the H. Subcomm. on
TARP, Fin. Servs. and Bailouts of Pub. and Private Programs of the H. Comm. on
available
at
Reform,
112
Cong.
92
(2011)
Oversight
and
Gov't
http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/3-30-11 -Subcommittee-on-TARP-

Financial-Services-and-Bailouts-of-Public-and-Private-Programs-Hearing-Transcript.pdf
(prepared statement of Prof. Anthony B. Sanders).
83.

See Stephen Gandel, Banks Left Out of TARP Bailout Could Face Extinction,

(Nov.
13,
2008),
TIME
BusINESS
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1858844,00.html (stating that consumers
will flee from banks that do not receive TARP assistance, "taking deposits and forcing
[them] to be liquidated or be sold.").
84.

Gaeta Interview, supranote 15.
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5. Basel III

As much as the banking community is concerned about DoddFrank, the new capital standards of Basel III should not be overlooked.
Basel III imposes standards that fall into three categories: risk-based
capital requirements, liquidity, and stress test. By 2013, banks will need
to reserve 3.5% share capital,85 4.5% Tier-i capital,86 and 8% total
capital; and by 2019, banks will need to have 4.5% share capital, 6%
Tier-1 capital, and 8% total capital. 87 Furthermore, the conservation
buffer 88 must be built up to 2.5% by 2019.89 In sum, banks will have to
hold 10.5% of their risk-weighted assets in capital. 90 Additionally, for
the first time, banks will be required to explicitly include operational
risks as a determinant of required capital. 9' Because banks will be
required to have more capital to back loans, they will likely have to
reduce loans if they cannot raise capital elsewhere. Such a dramatic
increase in capital requirements will make it difficult for community
banks to lend as before,92 which will potentially lower profits.93 Lower
profits may deter investors and thus perpetuate a circular capitalization
problem that many banks will not escape without private equity
investments, merging, or being acquired.94
As required by Basel III, the liquidity coverage ratio and the
stress test work together to promote conservative lending practices. The
liquidity coverage ratio is mandatory by January 1, 2015, 95 and ensures

85.

Share capital is the amount of capital that has been raised by selling company

stock. Basel Ill, supra note 4.

86.

Tier I capital is core capital, including equity capital and disclosed reserves. Basel

III, supra note 4.
87. BASEL lII, supra note 4. See also Expected Timeline of Basel Ill Implementation,

DELOITTE
(last
visited
Jan.
18,
2013),
http://www.deloitte.com/view/en NL/nl/industries/fmancial-servicesindustries/basel/timeline/index.htm [hereinafter Basel Timeline].
88. A conservation buffer is an amount of capital that is built up as a reserve so that it
may be drawn upon in times of economic stress. BASEL 1II, supra note 4.
89. BASEL III, supra note 4. Basel Timeline, supra note 87.
90. Basel Timeline, supra note 87.
91. Loriana Pelizzon & Stephen Schaefer, Pillar I vs. Pillar 2 Under Risk
Management, in THE RISKS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 377, (Mark Carey and Rend M.
Stulz eds., 2007), availableat http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9614.pdf.
92. Patterson Interview, supra note 65.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
Basel Timeline, supra note 87.
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that a bank has sufficient liquidity to accommodate its funding needs for
a full thirty days.96 This puts serious restrictions on types of assets that
a bank may lend against and makes it harder to give the loans needed in
order to make certain profits, and in turn attract potential investments.9 7
The stress test is the implementation of the Net Stable Funding Ratio
(NSFR), and will be introduced as a minimum standard as of January 1,
2018.98 The NSFR is the minimum standard of assets a bank must keep
that are deemed stable over a one-year period. 99 The stability
expectation of assets is based on liquidity risk factors.' 0 0 For example,
cash would be considered stable funding whereas a loan that will mature
in less than one year is not. The NSFR encourages banks to utilize
stable sources of funding for their activities in the hopes of promoting
resilience. 10 1 In sum, the liquidity coverage ratio and the NSFR will
lower the total amount that community banks are able to lend, which
will in turn lower profits earned from interest.
B.

Community Banks are Already Suffering

Requiring increased risk-based capital and high levels of
liquidity, along with limiting sources of funding, imposes a large strain
on already-struggling community banks. 10 2 Four hundred eighty-one
banks have failed since 2000, and 454 of those occurred during or after
2008.103 Failures peaked in 2010, and although they have been in

96. Sophie Baker, Basel III creates lending arm wrestle, FIN. NEWS (Sept. 11, 2012),
http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2012-05-28/basel-3-creates-lending-arm-wrestle.
97. Patterson Interview, supra note 65.
DELOITTE,
Funding
Ratio,
The
Net
Stable
98. See
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom(last
SouthAfrica/Local%20Assets/Documents/6.%2OBasel%20flyer/ 20-%20NSFR.pdf
visited Jan. 18, 2013); see also Basel Timeline, supra note 87.
99. See The Net Stable FundingRatio, supra note 98.
100. Id.
Ratio,
Funding
LLP, Basel
III's Net Stable
Hamilton
101. Pepper
http://www.pepperpodcasts.com/pepperpodcasts/2011/07/basel-iiis-net-stable-fundingratio.html.
102. Telephone Interview with Beth DeSimone, General Counsel, FNB United Corp
(Sept. 11, 2012) (notes on file with the North Carolina Banking Institute Journal) (stating
that capital is the number one issue of concern for community banks).
103. Between 2000 and 2007, there were a total of 27 failures, followed by 25 in 2008,
139 in 2009, 156 in 2010, 91 in 2011, and 41 as of September 7, 2012. FDIC, FAILED BANK
LIST, available at http://fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html (covering bank
failures between Jan. 1, 2000 and Aug. 27, 2012).
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steady decline, the number of failures in 2012 alone far exceeded the
total number of failures in the seven years before the financial crisis. A
great number of these failures have been banks with between $100
million and $250 million in assets. In North Carolina, Waccamaw Bank
in Whiteville, Blue Ridge Savings Bank in Asheville, The Bank of
Asheville, Cooperative Bank in Wilmington, and Cape Fear Bank in
10 4
Wilmington have all failed in recent years.
Community banks are facing a multitude of threats: the legal
and financial costs of Dodd-Frank compliance, the capital and liquidity
requirements of Basel III, a struggling commercial real estate market,
the lack of deposit capital caused in part by competition from credit
unions and TBTF "government backed" banks, and a lower deposit base
due to the expiration of the Transaction Account Guarantee (TAG) 0 5
program. 10 6 It may be only a matter of time before North Carolina
community banks are caught in a perpetual cycle of undercapitalization,
with the only hope for relief potentially coming from private equity
10 7
investments, merging, or being acquired.

104. Banks
that
have
failed in
North
Carolina, BANKRATE.COM,
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/banking/failed-banks-north-carolina.aspx (last visited Oct.
19, 2012).
105. TAG was designed to instill confidence in banks and increase deposits, but it
expired on December 31, 2012. The TAG placed an FDIC guarantee on bank accounts of
any size, as long as the account earns no interest. The ceiling had formerly been set at $250
thousand. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 20% of all bank deposits
were held under this program. The main concern is that deposit bases will drastically
decline now that the program has expired. TAG was both beneficial and detrimental to
banks. On one hand, the banks were given a large deposit base, but on the other, they were
not able to charge interest on those accounts. Some believe that the TAG program is not
good for banks because although it gives companies an insured and easily accessible place
to put money, once the economy is doing well, all the money in TAG accounts will be
pulled out so that it can be placed in an interest bearing account. For more information, see
Peter J. Wallison, End the TAG Program- It Puts Banks and the Economy at Risk, AM.
BANKER (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/end-the-tag-program-itputs-banks-and-the-economy-at-risk-1054869-1.html; see also Michelle Clark Neely, Is the
End Nearfor the Popular Transaction Account Guarantee Program,THE FED. RES. BANK
OF ST. Louis, http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/cb/articles/?id=2266.
106. Alan Kline, End of TAG Could Drive Consolidation,AM. BANKER (Sept. 19, 2012),
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_182/end-of-tag-could-drive-consolidation1052816-1 .html?CMP=OTC-RSS&utm source--twitterfeed&utm medium--twitter
(explaining that when the unlimited insurance on non-interest bearing accounts expires at
the end of 2012, deposits may be withdrawn, which could lead to bank failures).
107. Gaeta Interview, supra note 15.
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POTENTIAL RELIEF FOR COMMUNITY BANKS

Large Banks and Bank Holding Company Acquisitions

Currently, large bank entities and BHCs are reluctant to acquire
community banks, however, this was not always the case.1" 8 After
Riegle-Neil, consolidation occurred at a rapid pace,' 0 9 creating an
enormous amount of competition for the remaining banks. Community
banks now face a market that is saturated with banks whose assets are in
the billions." 0 Many large banking entities have reached a "critical
mass" in certain geographic areas"' and are simply not interested in
acquiring any more community banks because it would not be
financially beneficial. 112 In fact, with a strangle-hold on the market,
interstate banks seem content to watch the life slowly fade from the
eyes of community banks everywhere.
B.

PrivateEquity Fund Investments and Acquisitions

Private equity (PE) funds appear at first glance to be a potential
savior for struggling community banks. First, and perhaps most
importantly, PE funds have the ability to raise large amounts of
capital. 1 3 In fact, since 2010, PE funds have invested more than $500
million in North Carolina community banks, which has yielded positive
results. 14 Some banks have no option but to turn to PE, which is
already getting credit for reinvigorating the economy by supporting
struggling banks so that they are able to keep lending.' 15 Some believe

108.

Id.

109.

See Albert E. DePrince, Jr., Impact of the IBBEA on the Structure of the U.S. Bank

System: 1993-2003 3 (Mid. Tenn. St. Univ., Dep't of Econ. and Fin. Working Paper Series,
Jan. 2005), available at http://capone.mtsu.edu/berc/working/WP-DePrince-0 105.pdf.
110. Interview with Richard D. Callicut 1I, President, Bank of North Carolina (Sept. 21,

2012) (notes on file with the North Carolina Banking Institute Journal).
111.
Gaeta Interview, supra note 15.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Paul Davis, How Private Equity Is Reinvigorating North Carolina Banking, AM.
BANKER (June 14, 2012), http:/ibanksstreetpartners.com/article.da?id=49 (stating that
unemployment fell to 9.4% in April, 2012, down from 11% in June, 2010, according to U.S.

Bureau of Labor Statistics, and PE investment is credited with a supporting role in the
improvement).
115.

Id.
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that raising capital to fund growth, meet expected capital requirements,
and cover losses that are still on the books, is the biggest issue for
1 16
community banks.
There are several reasons why community banks could be
attractive investments for PE funds. In 2008, the percentage of a bank's
equity that private investors could own without exerting "control" over

a bank was raised. 1 7 This increased the amount PE funds can invest in
a community bank and still avoid federal banking regulation as a bank
holding company. 11 8 Additionally, the Office of the Comptroller of
Currency (OCC) implemented a "shelf charter," which remains inactive,
19
or "on the shelf," until an investor can acquire a failed institution.
Originally, a PE fund would have to go through a lengthy charter
approval process, which put PE funds at a disadvantage to interstate
banks and ultimately deterred PE funds from bidding on community

banks.1 20 The shelf charter is a temporary charter that allows non-bank
entities to immediately acquire deposits and assets of failed banks, thus
making PE bids more competitive. 121 Additionally, with a larger pool

of bidders, failed banks are more likely to get a higher purchase price.
However, the PE fairytale may be too good to be true. Despite

the good news of PE funds helping community banks in North Carolina,
many believe that community banks are simply too small and illiquid to

interest most PE investors.12 2 Furthermore, community banks do not
116. Andy Peters, Momentum Builds to Get More Capital into Smallest Banks, AM.
BANKER (Mar. 23, 2012), http:/Ibanksstreetpartners.corn/article.da?id=30; see also
DeSimone Interview, supra note 102 (stating that new capital requirements are one of the
biggest concerns for community bankers).
117. Frank Righeimer Martin, Private Equity Investments in FailedBanks: Appropriate
Investors Welcome, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 404, 410 (2010).

118. "Bank holding company" is defined in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
(BHCA) as "any company which has control over any bank." 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841(a)(1). A
company can be deemed a BHC if it is determined that the activities which a company is
engaged in is "so closely related to banking as to be a proper incident thereto." 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1843(c)(ii)(8). If an investment company or fund were determined to be a BHC, it would
be limited in the other activities it may take part in and would be subject to strict SEC
regulation. See BROOME, supra note 8, at 658.
119. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of Currency, OCC Approves Use of
Second Shelf Charter to Acquire Three Failed Banks (July 16, 2010), available at
see also
http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2010/nr-occ-2010-82.html;
Martin, supra note 117, at 410.
120. Martin, supra note 117, at 410.
121. Id.
122. Gaeta Interview, supra note 15; Patterson Interview, supra note 65; Callicut
Interview, supra note 110.
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currently provide the returns on investment to which PE funds are
accustomed. 23 Community banks used to provide, on average, a 15%
return on equity for investors. 124 Following the 2008 financial crisis,
banks were forced to write off bad debt incurred by the commercial real
estate market crash. As a result, return on equity dropped to an average

of 7-8%. 125
Despite the OCC's attempts to facilitate PE investments in
failing banks, PE funds are still wary about potential regulations. 126 To
avoid being labeled "in control" of a bank, and the accompanying
BHCA regulations, a holding company would have to "avoid exceeding
25% of any class of voting securities of the bank."' 127 A PE investor can
choose no more than one board member and own no more than 24.9%
of all voting shares if they are to be "non-controlling."' 128 Furthermore,
if a PE investor holds more than 10% of a bank's securities, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the investor does have "control.' 2 9 If PE
can only purchase 24.9% of a bank valued at less than $1 billion, have
limited control over management, and not receive the profits that they
30
desire, it may not be worth the risk.
Under the FDIC's Final Policy Statement, 13' any investments in
failing banks may be subject to a three-year holding period, during
which time the purchased interest cannot be sold. 132 This is good for
banks but bad for investors. The rule suggests that the Fed is wary of
shortsighted PE investments in failing banks. 1 A PE investor's goal is
to invest in a bank and turn it profitable in the shortest amount of time

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Patterson Interview, supra note 65.
Gaeta Interview, supra note 15; Patterson Interview, supra note 65.
Gaeta Interview, supra note 15.
Id.
Martin, supra note 117, at 407.
Private Equity Newsletter: Structuring Private Equity Investments in FDIC

"Problem" Institutions, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP (Mar.
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/c816ca5d-f74b-450e-bde 1b 1528a80135e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ab42637d-8c08-4c5f-803c-

29,

2010),

02fbb56c1292/032910_PE NL.pdf.
129. Gaeta Interview, supra note 15.
130. Id.
131. Andrew Gaydosh, Final Statement of Policy on Qualificationsfor Failed Bank
Acquisitions,
74
Fed.
Reg.
45440
(Aug.
20,
2009),
available
at

www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2009/09FinalSOP92.pdf.
132.
133.

Final Policy Statement Q&A, supra note 20.
Gaeta Interview, supra note 15.
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possible, usually in five to eight years, 134 perhaps even at the expense of
long-term viability, so that it can be sold quickly and for a profit.13 5 The
Fed is concerned that PE's interest in short-term profitability will
encourage lowered lending standards, which, despite making the bank
immediately more profitable on paper, could lead to its failure in the
36
future; that is, after the PE fund has sold its bank shares.'
C.

Community Bank Mergers

Perhaps the best option for North Carolina's struggling
community banks is to combine their resources. Mergers are already
prevalent in North Carolina and in other nearby states. For example,
Old Line Bancshares, a Maryland bank with assets of $846 million,
recently announced its plans to buy WSB Holdings, its second in-state
acquisition in two years. 137 The acquisition is in direct response to the
growing threat of acquisitions by out-of-state banks. In 2001, out-ofstate banks controlled 43% of the deposit market share in Maryland, but
by 2011, that number had risen to 79%. 13 8 Because potential buyers are
not interested in the remaining acquisition targets, it may be up to
community banks to band together to grow in order to compete in an
increasingly consolidated market. 139 This trend is already occurring in
North Carolina. In 2012, Bank of North Carolina, a bank with thirtyseven offices and approximately $3 billion in assets, entered into a
purchase agreement to acquire Hampton Roads Bankshares, after
already acquiring KeySource Bank earlier in the year.' 40 KeySource
CEO Don Draughton stated that one reason the bank was looking to
grow is to provide protection from expected costs imposed by DoddFrank.

134.

14 1

Callicut Interview, supra note 110.

135. Gaeta Interview, supra note 15.
136. Id.
137. Rachel Witkowski, Maryland Bankers Urged to Merge, AM. BANKER (Sept. 12,
2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_1 76/maryland-bankers-turn-inward-tosave-themselves- 1052549-1 html.
138. Id.
139. See cf id.
140. Callicut Interview, supra note 110.
141. Laura Oleniacz, KeySource, Bank of North Carolinato Merge, THE HERALD SUN
(Dec. 2011), available at http://www.heraldsun.com/view/full_story/16862948/articleKeySource-Bank-of-North-Carolina-to-merge.
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If a community bank is looking to grow, loss sharing may
provide the incentive and security needed to purchase failed community
banks or their assets. By guaranteeing a certain percentage of a failing
bank's assets, the FDIC can get a higher price for the sale of the bank's
of having a
assets. 142 In return, the purchaser gets the assurance
43
FDIC.1
the
by
backed
investment
their
of
percentage
Unfortunately, many problems emerge from community bank
mergers. 144 For one, there can be issues if either the buyer or the seller
is not publicly traded. 145 Investments from the community are common
when a community bank is chartered, and stock in initial offerings has
146
historically sold in North Carolina for approximately $11 per share.
In the past, community banks sold for 2 to 3 times their book value, but
now they are now selling for well below it. 147 Stockholders are
reluctant to sell for $6 what they purchased for $11, and directors may
be reluctant to make such a request.
Additionally, it may be
problematic for the merged community bank to determine who will
serve as officers and who will sit on the new, consolidated board of
48
directors.
Despite the problems that arise from a "merger of equals, 14 9
community bank mergers may be the best, if not the only hope for many
struggling community banks. The question is, how big is big enough?
There was a time when it was generally accepted that a $150 million
asset bank was sufficiently profitable. 50 Now many bankers (especially
investment bankers) say that a strong bank needs at least $1 billion in
assets,1 5 1 and some believe that banks need to be at the $5 billion mark
to be sufficiently profitable. 52 In examining the nationwide statistical
data of assets and deposits held by banks that failed in 2011, a pattern

142.

See

Loss-Share

Questions

and

Answers,

FDIC,

http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/lossshare/index.html (last updated Dec. 3, 2012).
143.

Id.

144.

Gaeta Interview, supra note 15 (stating his opinion based on more than thirty years

of M&A experience).
145. See Supra Part II.A.3.
146. Gaeta Interview, supra note 15.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See id. (noting that there is "no real merger of equals").
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Callicut Interview, supra note 110.
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emerges. Approximately fifty percent of the ninety-two failures in 2011
53
were banks that had between $100 million and $250 million in assets.
The number of bank failures with $250 million to $500 million in assets
comprised approximately seventeen percent of the bank failures that
year, only approximately thirteen percent had assets of $500 million to
$1 billion, and nine percent had assets over $1 billion. 154 The bigger the
entity, the more easily an institution is able to withstand compliance
costs and maintain minimum capital requirements. Based on the data
from 2011, a strong argument can be made that a bank's chance of
failing significantly drops once it reaches $250 million or more in
assets. Specifically, in 2011, banks with under $250 million in assets
were three times more likely to fail than banks above that asset
threshold. 155
D.

A CombinationStrategy

No matter the cause of the problem, it is clear that many
community banks in North Carolina will need to raise capital to survive,
whether by PE investment, acquisition, or community bank merger.
Realistically, all three avenues will likely be necessary to the survival of
North Carolina's struggling community banks.
For example, in
September 2012, ECB Bancorp (ECB), an Englehard, North Carolina
company with $917 million in assets, announced that it would sell to
Crescent Financial Bancshares (CRFN), based in Raleigh, North
Carolina. 56 CRFN is substantially owned by Piedmont Community
Bank Holdings, which is a PE-backed banking company. 5 7 The deal to
acquire seventy-eight percent of ECB's tangible book value will close
in 2013, pending shareholder approval.158 Dwight Utz, ECB's president
and CEO, explained that the sale was in the best interest of the company
after it failed to raise a planned $80 million in PE funds, which it had

153. See
Bank
Failures
In
Brief
FDIC,
available
at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/2011/index.html (last updated Jan. 11, 2013).
154. See Bank Failuresin Brief supra note 153.
155. Id.
156. Robert Barba, ECB Bancorp CEO Seizes Opportunity to Sell to Well-Funded Rival,
AM. BANKER (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_186/ecbbancorp-ceo-seizes-opportunity-to-sell-to-well-funded-rival-1053014-1.html.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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planned to use to buy several North Carolina branches from the
Norfolk, Virginia based Hampton Roads Bankshares. 15 9 The investment
fell through because one of the investors failed to obtain regulatory
approval. 160
This transaction is an example of how mergers or
acquisitions can work in conjunction with PE investments, and
considering the current climate; community banks in North Carolina
will need to seize every available opportunity.
IV. THE FUTURE OF COMMUNITY BANKS
A.

UniversalBanking Regulations: A Necessary Evil?

The common theme of community bankers today is the feeling
that they are being punished in response to a financial crisis that was
caused by the actions of large investment banks.' 6 1 Despite the disdain
among community banks for Dodd-Frank and new banking regulations,
there are those who feel that more effective regulation of the entire
62
banking industry is essential to avoiding another financial disaster.'
For one, the large number of small bank failures demonstrates that
many community banks were not as stable as they believed themselves
to be. Banks that were too concentrated in the commercial real estate
lending market were devastated when that market crashed. 63 The
banks that were conservative and well capitalized are still around today,
and the banks that were not, are not. 164
Finally, community banks have been serving their communities
for decades in ways that large interstate banks simply cannot. 165 Is it
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Grant, supra note 52, at 2; see also The Adverse Consequences of the DoddFrank Act on Community Bank Customers and Borrowers Before the S. Comm. On
Oversight and Investigations of the H.Comm. on Fin. Services, 112th Cong. 2 (July 19,
2012) (testimony of Jim R. Purcell, Chairman and C.E.O. of The State Nat'l Bank of Big
Spring), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg- 112-baO9-wstatejpurcell-20120719.pdf.
162. John C. Williams, President's Speech, Bank Regulation in the Post-Crisis World,
at
BANKERS
ASS'N
(May
4,
2012),
available
CAL.
http://www.frbsf.org/news/speeches/2012/john-williams0504.html?utmsource=mailchimp&utm medium=email&utm campaign=presidentsspeech-2012-05-04.
163. Gaeta Interview, supra note 15.
164. Patterson Interview, supra note 67.
165. See generally Grant, supra note 52, at 2.
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fair, then, to impose these regulations indiscriminately? To answer this
question, we must look at the effects of community bank regulation on
the primary customers of community banks: individual and small
businesses in the local community.
B.

The PotentialEffects on Communities and Small Businesses:
Who Can Fill the Void?
1. Consumer Banking

The struggles of community banks in North Carolina will have a
minimal effect on most everyday consumers. 166 They will likely notice
local branches going out of business, leaving vacant commercial
buildings, equipped with a drive-through windows and vacuum tube
systems. Undoubtedly, other entities will fill in to meet the banking
needs of most general customers. 167 Credit unions and large banks, with
strategic branch placement, will continue to provide standard deposit
accounts, credit cards, home mortgage loans, and personal loans.
However, it may be more difficult for some borrowers to be approved
for credit. Credit unions, as non-profit and tax-exempt entities, have
very conservative lending standards,168 and big banks are not willing to
provide "reputational lending" to the same extent as community
banks. 169 Other than stricter lending standards, consumers should be
able to continue to enjoy relatively the same banking options that they
always have.
Despite having access to the same banking options as before, the
disappearance of community banks in North Carolina will forever
170
change the dynamic between local banks and their customers.
Community banks know their customers well and are able to offer more
personalized service and advice. 17
But, according to Richard D.
166.

Patterson Interview, supra note 65.

167. DeSimone Interview, supra note 102 (stating other banks may be able to provide
standard account services, but the biggest void that community banks will likely leave is in
the availability of small business loans).
168. Id. (stating that capital is the number one issue of concern for community banks).
169.

Callicut Interview, supra note 110 (stating that the days of lending based off

personal relationships is likely over).
170. Id.
171. See Louis Hernandez, Community Banks A Better PartnerFor Business: Opinion,
CNBC
(Feb.
15,
2012),
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Callicut II, the President of Bank of North Carolina, the times have
passed when a community banker can say as a legitimate consideration
for a loan, "I know that guy, I know his family, and I know that he is
172
good for it.',
2. Commercial and Small Business Loans
The main way in which the public will feel the impact of
community bank failures will be in the decreased availability of funding
for small businesses and commercial real estate.' 73 Local banks have an
interest in helping local businesses grow in order to stimulate the local
economy, which in turn attracts more business. 174 This is illustrated by
the fact that as a percentage of total assets, community banks have a
1 75
much higher percentage of small business loans than large banks.
Furthermore, as of December 2009, community banks made over half of
all small business loans under $100,000.176 Many of the loans small
business owners depend on to start new businesses, or expand existing
177
businesses, will not be available if community banks disappear
because conservative credit unions limit the number of business loans
they issue and big banks rarely consider reputational factors in lending
decisions. 178 Additionally, very few banks will be interested in lending
for residential or commercial real estate development because of the
volatility and the high risk associated with such loans.' 79 Unfortunately,
the community banks that do survive will likely not be in a position to
make the loans that used to be common in small communities because

http://www.cnbc.com/id/46398866/CommunityBanks ABetterPartnerFor BusinessO

pinion.
172.

Callicut Interview, supranote 110.

173. DeSimone Interview, supra note 102 (stating that capital is the number one issue of
concern for community banks).
174. See Hernandez, supra note 171.
175. See id.
176. Interview by Judy interview of President Barack Obama, PBS (Dec. 22, 2009),
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/uly-decO9/banks 12-22.html.
177. See John Tozzi, Weak Banks Drag on Small Business Lending, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 28, 2012), available at http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-

08-28/weak-banks-drag-on-small-business-lending (stating that weak community banks are
bringing down small business lending).
178.
179.

Callicut Interview, supranote 110.
Gaeta Interview, supra note 15.
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of risk standards and capital requirements; 80 but, those that do remain
will be more important than ever in providing their communities with
the services that large banks and credit unions cannot.
Small businesses suffer when community banks fail, and
communities suffer along with them. 18 1 Small businesses are the
"backbone of the community," and as such, when small businesses are
in decline, local economies struggle, local government revenue declines,
and unemployment rises. 182 Affected communities may take years to
183
recover, if they are able to recover at all.
V. CONCLUSION

Community banks in North Carolina are facing uncertainty.
Regulations imposed by Dodd-Frank, compounded with existing
regulations, place monumental compliance obligations on banks with
very limited resources. Additionally, Basel III capital requirements and
liquidity standards will make it hard for any small bank to be profitable.
In order to survive, community banks need to raise capital. Large banks
and BHCs are not acquiring community banks like they were when
prohibitions on interstate branching were initially lifted, which leaves
community banks with limited options.
PE funds have significantly helped North Carolina community
banks in the past several years. However, PE's short-term investment
horizon does not always align with the long-term perspective of many
community banks. Moreover, most community banks are simply too
small for PE to (1) turn the expected profit, (2) take the risk of failure,
(3) take the time and resources to acquire, or (4) risk being subject to an
onslaught of banking regulations. Certainly, PE will continue to play a
role in the banking industry and a role in the salvation of community
banks, but all in all, PE funds do not appear to be the answer. Instead,
community bank mergers may be the best way for smaller banks to raise
capital, reach a size in which they are able to afford the cost of
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compliance, and turn an appropriate profit. It is probable, however, that
PE investments, acquisition by large banks and BHCs, and community
bank mergers will all play a role in the salvation of North Carolina's
community banks.
The future looks bleak for community banks in North Carolina.
It is possible that most will simply not survive. If that is true, big banks
and credit unions will still remain to fulfill most communities' banking
needs. However, small businesses will suffer, and as a result, the
communities that are losing their local banks will suffer. Maybe
consolidation and the disappearance of community banks is simply the
next stage in the evolution of the banking industry. However, what is
certain is that the community banks that funded the building of local
communities in North Carolina will never be the same.
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